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NOTES
TRIBAL COURT GENERAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
OVER ACTIONS BETWEEN NON-INDIAN PLAINTIFFS

AND DEFENDANTS: STRATE v. A-1 CONTRACTORS
Jamelle King*
The reservations, with their courts and other institutions, are
destined to disappearin time. The only questions is, When? The
true motivations behind, and justificationfor, Indian separatism
are psychological. ... [Sleparatist rhetoric may be useful in
restoringa sense ofpersonal(or "cultural,"if one insists)identity
and worth to the members of an ethnic minority that has a history
of being suppressed, exploited, and kept dependent. That is the
total role. ..
L Introduction
On January 7, 1997, the United States Supreme Court heard the oral
arguments in Strate v. A-1 Contractors This case arose from a ruling
adverse to tribal interests by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. It involves an issue that has engendered much interest and
commentary but has never been confronted directly, either by Congress or the
courts. That is, whether the tribal courts may adjudicate civil actions between
two non-Indians.
The incident which led to Strate occurred on November 9, 1990, when a
truck and car, belonging to two non-Indians, collided on a state highway
which traversed a reservation. This case focuses on an issue vitally important
to the integrity and viability of tribal nations, the continuing struggle of the

*Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. SAMUEL BRAKEL, INDIAN TRIBAL COuRTs: THE COST OF SEPARATE JUSTICE 101-02

(1978).
2. Petitioner's Brief, Strate v. A-i Contractor, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997) (No. 95-1872),
availablein 1996 WL 656356. The Supreme Court issued its opinion in this matter on April 28,
1997. Melody McCoy and Don Wharton, Native American Rights Fund (NARF) attorneys,
represented the tribal interests, the Honorable William D. Strate, Associate Tribal Judge of the

Tribal Court of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, and the Tribal
Court. It appears that the Fredericks, one of the non-Indian accident victims inStrate, obtained
their own private counsel (referred to subsequently as the Fredericks and the tribal parties). See
Courts Rule in Two Landmark Cases Affecting Tribal Court Jurisdiction,NARF LEGAL REV.,
Winter/Spring 1997, at 10, 10. McCoy is only one of five Indian women to ever argue a case

before this country's highest Court. Il
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Furthermore, this case pits

inherent tribal sovereignty against dominant non-Indian interests, such as
matters relating to business,4 and exemplifies the states' and judiciaries'
relentless endeavors to undermine tribal authority! Strate is the culmination

3. For an article discussing the "contextual legitimacy" of tribal courts, see Frank
Pommersheim, The Contextual Legitimacy of Adjudication in Tribal Courts and the Role of the
Tribal Bar as an Interpretive Community: An Essay, 18 N.M. L. REv. 49 (1988).
4. Nell Jessup Newton, In the U.S. Supreme Court: TribalJurisdictionOver PersonalInjury
Actions Between Non-Indians, WEsT's LEGAL NEws, Dec. 30, 1996, available in 1996 WL
738536 (publication page references are not available for this document).
5. For example, four amicus curiae briefs were filed in favor of A-I Contractors. First, 14
states urged the Court to deny tribal expressions of civil jurisdictions. These states would like
one to believe that Indian tribes are nothing more than quasi sovereigns and "not a party to the
Federal Union," which is actually tripartite and incorporates the Indian tribes as one of the
sovereigns. Brief Amicus Curiae for Stales of Montana, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New York, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming in Support of Respondents at *7, Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997)
(No. 95-1872), available in 1996 WL 709324.
The states wrote:
Since tribes and their courts are not subject to the constitutional restraints, such as
the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, which operate as a check on federal power
vis-a-vis the States, accepting the broad 'territorial' view of tribal court power
advanced by Petitioners and their amici may threaten to radically reshape
traditional notions of state sovereignty. These concerns are heightened by the
possible unavailability of federal court review with respect to the merits of claims
decided by tribal courts.
Id. at *3.
Second, a conglomeration of organizations, representing a variety of'state-related interests,
coalesced in support of Respondent. The state and county associations mimicked the Eighth
Circuit's argument that an accident on a reservation is not a "valid" interest of the tribe.
[Ajlthough the respondent contractor had a contract with a tribal entity, basing
tribal jurisdiction on an attenuated but for causation arising from the contractor's
travel on the highway would sweep into tribal court any cause of action based on
the contractor's mere presence. Similarly, the facts do not threaten or directly
affect the political integrity or welfare of the tribe.
Brief of the Council of State Governments, National Conference of State Legislatures, National
Governors' Association, National Association of Counties, U.S. Conference of Mayors,
International City/County Management Association, and National League of Cities as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents at *5, Strate (No. 95-1872), available in 1996 WL 709325.
Third, a national trade association of the trucking industry, representing 51 affiliated state
trucking associations, along with a motor club, representing more than 39 million motorists, and
one of the nation's largest railroads formed the third group. Their members conduct business on
and traverse the reservations. Therefore, they expressed serious concerns about the significant due
process implications of extending tribal court jurisdiction to non-Indians.
By their very nature, tribal courts are ill-suited to adjudicate claims by members
of the tribe or their families against outsiders. Furthermore, because the extent of
judicial review available outside of the tribal court system is far from clear, there
are no real constraints on tribal court to ensure that all litigants, including nonIndian defendants, are afforded due process and equal protection of the law.
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of non-Indian and state fears of tribal civil jurisdiction assertions over nonIndians on Indian land, the fear of local bias and tribal court incompetence.'
Part II of this note will examine the cases involving civil tribal
adjudicatory authority. Part I details the civil tribal regulatory cases
beginning with Montana v. United States. Part IV discusses the concept of
inherent tribal sovereignty. Part V relates the factual history of Strate v. A-i
Contractors. Parts VI and VII consider the legal history and the decisions.
Part VIII advances the proposition that the Supreme Court erred in this case,
with part IX forecasting the future ramifications of this deleterious decision.

Brief for the American Trucking Associations, Inc., the American Automobile Association, and
the Burlington Northern Railroad Co. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at *6-*7, Strate
(No. 95-1872), available in 1996 WL 711202.
Fourth,in a very well-written and persuasive piece, albeit incorrect and misinformed, several
local governments overseeing land that was located in the original boundaries of the Flathead
Indian Reservation consolidated to argue against tribal civil jurisdiction. Lake County vehemently
opposed the argument that tribes possess "territorial jurisdiction" just as do the states. "[Tribes
are not states. They have no constitutional standing as sovereigns, lack any constitutional
constraints in governing, and as a result of their status within the United States, exercise limited,
quasi-sovereign powers over internal matters subject to the plenary power of Congress." Brief
of Amici Curiae Lake County, Montana, and Flathead Joint Board of Control of the Mission, and
Jocko Valley Irrigation Districts in Support of Respondents at *12-*13, Strate (No. 95-1872),
available in 1996 WL 709326.

6. One case which is cited repeatedly for the proposition of tribal court abuse of power is
BurlingtonN. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 106 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1997), wherein the Crow Tribal Court
rendered a judgment in the amount of $250 million for a train collision which killed two tribal
members at a railroad crossing on the reservation. Id. at 869. Of the seven jurors, six were
related to the two decedents. Id. at 872. The tribal court judge instructed the jurors as follows:
Now Crows, you in this room all of you. This matter you know well; you are not
young. This matter we respect. There is prayer involved in this matter. Our way
of life, our good way of life. A train runs through the middle of our land. Crows,
you know, I don't have to tell you. Bodies, in the past, bodies are scattered along
the railway. Now, this is the day. You use your better judgment. I am not telling
you what to do. I am not telling you who to follow. I am not telling you who to
believe. Use your better judgment. God gave you a mind. God gave you a heart.
This day, even this day use it. How am able to help. You should consider if you
are a Crow. I don't have to tell you, you must use your mind. Look for a good
solution. If this proceeding is successful, you will not be blamed. You are right,
you are correct, you are proper. In the past this bench we were ridiculed. The
people who presided are called upon. The people who presided are ridiculed,
mocked. That's the way you Crows are. Within our reservation there is not many.
You Crows established it. Other tribes are under the government, CFR. We are
lucky. We have our own court. Consider that, you men and women. If you are
kind, if you love, we are interrelated. Use your better judgment. Consider your
people. Consider these people, consider those people. Use your better judgment.
I want the creator to guide you. We are not kidding. Remember, young men and
women. You are selected today because you are honest, because of your
genealogy.
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Part X concludes by urging Congress to take immediate action by superseding
the decision with a statutory enactment.
II. Civil Tribal Adjudicatory Jurisdiction
Tribal courts possess exclusive tribal court jurisdiction over claims
"brought by or against" an Indian person that arise in Indian country.7
Willianr involved an action against an Indian in state court by a reservationbased non-Indian general store operator. Williams, reaffirming an earlier case
which had laid a clear foundation, pronounced that absent some clear
congressional authority, the states have no authority in Indian country except
when no significant Indian interests exist.' Since Williams, many tribes have
begun to exercise civil authority over non-Indians for their on-reservation
activities.
In National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe, a default
judgment was entered against the non-Indian defendants in the tribal court."0
The Supreme Court concluded that the "extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction
will require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which
that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a
detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in
treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions," and then
remanded the case so the tribal court remedies could be exhausted."
National Farmers established the exhaustion requirement of tribal court
remedies under section 1331 of the Judicial Code 2 before access to the
federal courts becomes available. As a result, the Judicial Code restricts easy
access to the federal courts when a non-Indian alleges the tribal court
possesses no power to adjudicate a claim. However, the Supreme Court in
National Farmersfailed to address the civil adjudicatory powers of the tribe
over non-Indians.

7. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). The court stated that "the question has
always ben whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their
own laws and be ruled by them." Id. The so-called "infringement test" established in Williams
was further clarified in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
McClanahaninvolved the state taxation of a reservation Indian for income earned exclusively on

the reservation. Id. at 165-66. The court limited the Williams test to situations principally
involving non-Indians and held the state possessed no jurisdiction to impose such a tax over a
reservation Indian. Id. at 179-81.
8. Williams carries the basic core of Worcesterv. Georgia,31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), into
the 1970s - the inability of state law and power to intrude into Indian country. Williams, 358
U.S. at 223. Therefore, the basic policy of Worcesterremains, although, with some modification.
9. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
10. Id. at 845.
11. hi.at 855-57.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (federal question jurisdiction). The statute reads as follows:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id.
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Once again in Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. LaPlante,'3 the Court
skirted around the issue of tribal civil authority over non-Indians.'4 The
Court was afforded the opportunity to directly answer the question; however,
the Court declined to settle the controversy.'" In Iowa Mutual Insurance, an

13. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
14. One must also consider whether we want the judicial branch or the legislative branch
making these types of decisions. Incoherence and inconsistency evolves when both fail to address
the issue; therefore, one is left to make the decision to act, this in turn, forces the other branch
to take reactionary measures as occurred with Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 695-96 (1990),
superseded by statute 25 U.S.C. 1301(1) & (2) (1994), wherein the Court determined that tribal
criminal jurisdiction did not exist over nonmember Indians. Congress later promulgated a statute
superseding this fatuous decision.
15. The Court made it very plain during oral argument in Strate v. A-I Contractorsthat a
dispute exists as to the true meaning of Iowa Mutual. The following questions illustrate this most
powerfully:
QUESTION: Isn't there, Ms. McCoy, some dispute about the second case
[Iowa Mutual] that you mention, whether it meant anything more than you have
to exhaust the tribal court process? It didn't make an ultimate determination that
there was tribal court jurisdiction. Isn't that so?
ANSWER-MS. McCOY: No, I don't think there is any dispute.
QUESTION: Is it not so that subsequent cases of this Court have said that
about Iowa Mutual? (referring to Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of
the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989)).
ANSWER-MS. McCOY: I believe that the reference there was in the plurality
opinion in the Brendale case, a 1989 case. But that arose dealing with the issue
in Brendale of the tribe's authority to regulate the private property of non-Indians.
That's not the case here.
QUESTION: But whatever Brendaleinvolved, it did distinguish Iowa Mutual
on the basis that it was merely an exhaustion, that there was not determination that
the tribe as opposed to the State had jurisdiction.
ANSWER-MS. McCOY: To the extent the plurality in Brendale did hold that,
that was not necessary to the Brendale ruling and I think also the proper way to
read Iowa Mutual is that - I realize it set the exhaustion rule.
It also set the rule by which exhaustion would be conducted, or else exhaustion
itself would be meaningless exercise, because as this Court said in National
Farmers Union, where it expressly rejected the argument that respondents make
here now for a rule of general and implicit divestiture of tribal court jurisdiction
over reservation-based civil actions, that was unanimously rejected in National
Farmers Union.
And 2 years later in Iowa Mutual, when it again dealt with the issue of how
to exhaust, Iowa Mutual set a clear rule that tribal courts presumptively have
jurisdiction over reservation-based civil actions against non-Indians, and the lower
courts have relied on that QUESTION: That was dicta, though, was it not? You didn't have to say that
in order to decide the question that the Court took the case to decide.
ANSWER-MS. McCOY: I think that was the rule of that case by which
exhaustion was to be conducted, because it gives guidance to the tribal courts and
the Federal courts on that very issue, and we don't have Congress divesting this
tribe's jurisdiction.
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action was instituted in the Blackfeet Tribal Court by LaPlante, a member of
the Blackfeet Indian Tribe, against Iowa Mutual Insurance Company for
injuries incurred within the reservation boundaries. 6 The Court concluded
that a federal court may not exercise diversity jurisdiction 7 before the tribal
court system has had an opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction.,"
Both National Farmers and Iowa Mutual Insurance involved
defendants who tried to leap-frog tribal courts by proceeding
directly to federal court upon being served with papers to appear
in tribal court. After these cases, then, defendants must contest
jurisdiction in the tribal court before going to federal court. A-]
Contractorsis the first case to come to the Supreme Court after
exhaustion in tribal court.'"
III. Civil Tribal Regulatory Authority
Several cases have denied the extension of tribal civil regulatory
jurisdiction over non-Indians, that is, the application of tribal law to the given
situation. In Montana v. United States," a case which severely restricted
tribal sovereignty, the Court determined that the Crow Tribe of Montana did
not possess the authority to prohibit hunting and fishing on lands owned in fee
simple within the reservation by non-members.' As a result of this decision,
the Montana Court established the general rule that tribes may not regulate
non-Indian activity on fee land within the reservation.
The Montana Court created two exceptions where the tribe may properly
exercise its authority. First, the Court stated, "[a] tribe may regulate, through
taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members."' Second, "[a] tribe
may... retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe."'
"In short, Montana established a

Oral Arguments Transcripts at *12-*14, Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997) (No.
95-1872), available in 1997 WL 10398.
16. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 11.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
18. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 19. "Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on

reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty. Civil jurisdiction over such activities
presumptiiely lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision
or federal statute." Id. at 18 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
19. Newton, supra note 4.
20. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
21. Id. at 566-67.
22. Id. at 565.
23. Id. at 566.
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presumption against tribal regulation of conduct by non-Indians under certain
circumstances, absent proof that one of the two Montana exceptions had been
met."
Eight years later, in a case which can, at best, be described as employing
the Montana analysis, the Supreme Court examined the issue of tribal zoning
of fee land within the reservation. In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,' the Supreme Court, presenting a
fractured 4-2-3 opinion,' determined that the tribes possessed zoning
authority over the closed part of the reservation, including the non-Indian fee
lands.' Only three percent of the closed area land was owned in fee
simple.' The open area consisted of mostly agricultural areas with almost
fifty percent being owned in fee by non-Indians. 9 This fractionation in the
open area resulted in major checkerboarding and an integrated community that
had lost its Indian character.
Applying the Montana test, the Court in Brendale further limited the tribes'
ability to rely on these exceptions when asserting tribal regulatory jurisdiction
as against a state's exercise of such authority. Basically, Brendale resulted in
an application of the Montana standard with an added, somewhat subtle,
variation: "The impact must be demonstrably serious and must imperil the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of the
tribe." As a result of this variation, the Montana exceptions now rest on
shakier ground.
Several years later, the Supreme Court, in South Dakota v. Bourland,3"
once again altered the scope of the Montana exceptions. Bourland involved
the governmental taking of 104,420 acres of trust land belonging to the

24. Newton, supra note 4.
25. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
26. Justices White, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy agreed that no tribal authority existed
over fee lands in the open area. Id. at 425. Justices Steven and O'Connor joined in the
concurrence, id. at 433-48, with Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissenting, id. at 44868. Justice Steven's opinion functioned as the decision as to the closed area of the reservation,
while Justice White's opinion served as the decision relating to the open area of the reservation.
As to the closed area, Justices Stevens and O'Connor believed the tribe possessed exclusive tribal
jurisdiction, with Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall concurring. Id. at 444. Justices
White, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy dissented. This resulted in a 5-4 split as to the tribe's
authority to zone iin the closed area. Justice White concluded that the zoning decision resided
with the county after it received the information from the environmental impact statement (EIS).
Id. at 432. Justice Blackmun would have affirmed tribal authority over the entire reservation. Id.
at 460. Justice White decided that the tribe could not rely on treaty rights as enumerated in the
Montana decision. Id. at 421-25. "Congress hald] not expressly delegated to the Yakima Nation
the power to zone fee lands of nonmembers of the tribe." Id. at 428.
27. Id. at 431-32.

28. Id. at 415.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 430.
31. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
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Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe for the Oahe Dam and Reservoir Project." This
case possesses little precedential value outside of this context. However, the
Supreme Court, in discussing Montana and Brendale, stated that these two
cases "establish that when an Indian tribe conveys ownership of its tribal
lands to non-Indians, it loses any former right of absolute and exclusive use
and occupation of the conveyed lands."33 The Court concluded that the Flood
Control Act's open-access mandate and the Cheyenne River Act's applicable
provisions positively abrogated the Tribe's authority to enforce gaming and
fishing n-gulations in the taken area.'
IV. Inherent Tribal Sovereignty
Throughout this nation's political history, a struggle has existed between the
federal, state, and tribal governments as to which respective sovereign
properly possesses the right to govern in any given situation. Indian tribes
maintain all the sovereign powers which have been rightfully theirs since time
immemorial except those that have been "qualified or limited by treaties,
agreements, or specific acts of Congress."35 Tribes do not act only when
Congress has so deemed it. "The point to remember is that all of the powers
were once held by the tribes, not the U.S. government."' These inherent
powers include the following:
(1) The power to determine the form of government.
(2) The power to define conditions for membership in the nation.
(3) The power to administer justice and enforce laws.
(4) The power to tax.
(5) The power to regulate domestic relations of its members.
(6) The power to regulate property use.37

32. Id. at 682.

33. Id. at 689.
34. Id. at 690.
35. Kirke Kickingbird et al., "IndianSovereignty", in 6 NArIvE AMERICANS AND THE LAW
7-8 (John R. Wunder ed., 1996). Congress' ability to control Indian affairs is referred as the
"plenary power." Vine Deloria, Jr., writes,
Conservative judicial activism now threatens to create a new set of criteria limiting
what Congress can do for and on behalf of Indians. We can see no effort to limit
the power of Congress to deprive Indians of their rights because the judicial
system is already at work on that problem.
Vine Deloria, Jr., Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and the Powers of Indian Tribes, 38 ARIZ.
L. REy. 963, 979 (1996) (critiquing the reliance on Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of FederalIndian
Law in a searing and scathing commentary; a handbook originally designed for the Department
of Justice to be used against Indians).
36. Kickingbird, supra note 35, at 8.

37. iAL
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V. The FactualHistory of Strate v. A-i Contractors

The Three Affiliated Tribes" reside on the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation in west central North Dakota. The population consists of 2999
enrolled tribal members, 62 nonmember Indians, and 2396 non-Indians 9 In
1970, the Secretary of the Interior granted the State a "limited easement' to
pave and maintain a 6.59 mile stretch of Highway 8 within the
Reservation.""' All the land Highway 8 traverses constitutes Indian trust
land. 2 Indeed, no non-trust land within the reservation is even intruded
upon.43 A sign, along with the State speed limit sign, is posted at the
entrance of the Reservation, alerting those travelling on Highway 8 that they
are entering Fort Berthold Indian Reservation."
Since the 1940s, the highway operated as a Bureau of Indian Affairs gravel
service road that ran to the tribal headquarters.4 The building of the
Garrison Dam and Lake Sakakawea forced the tribal headquarters to move.
Today, Highway 8 terminates at the shores of Lake Sakakawea." Due to the
lake, the Tribes desired to pave this road to serve the isolated Twin Buttes
tribal community.47 The highway functions as a passage way to the two dock
sites located at or around Twin Buttes; however, it is not a major
thoroughfare.

38. The Mandan, Hidates, and Arikara. Petitioner's Brief at *2, Strate v. A-I Contractors,
117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997) (No. 95-1872), available in 1996 WL 656356.
39. Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF
POPULATION: GENERAL POPULATION CHARACrERISTICS: AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA
NATIVE AREAS at 6 (1992)).
40. Brief of the Council of State Governments, National Conference of State Legislatures,
National Governors' Association, National Association of Counties, U.S. Conference of Mayors,
International City/County Management Association, and National League of Cities as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents at *16, Strafe (No. 95-1872), available in 1996 WL 709325
(citing Indian Rights-of-Way Act, Act of Feb. 5, 1948, 62 Stat. 17 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 323328 (1994)). The Secretary of the Interior must obtain consent 6f the landowner, 25 U.S.C. § 324
(1994), and must pay just compensation for the interest granted, id. § 325.
41. Petitioner's Reply Brief at *4, Strate (No. 95-1872), available at 1996 WL 739255.
42. ld. at *3.
43. Petitioner's Brief at *3, Strate (No. 95-1872), available in 1996 WL 656356.
44. Oral Argument Transcript at *7, Strate (No. 95-1872), available in 1997 WL 10398.
This road continues for approximately seven miles. Id.
45. Id. at *9.
46. Id.
47. Twin Buttes has the following attributes: a population of 300, a K-8 tribal school, an
Indian Health Service satellite clinic, and a tribal community center (which A-I Contractors
helped to build).
48. Oral Arguments Transcript at *11, Strate (No. 95-1872), available in 1997 WL 10398.
Twin Buttes itself is located three miles below the lake on the highway. Id. The use of the
highway constitutes primarily "seasonal use." Id. However, many other roads on the Reservation
serve as major access for recreational and other purposes to the Lake. Id.
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Both the Tribe and the State are responsible for setting the rules and

regulations applicable to driving on Highway 8 within the Reservation." The
Bureau of Indian Affairs, tribal, and State police patrol this 6.59 mile stretch

of road. However, the primary enforcers are the Bureau of Indian Affairs and
the Tribe."

Gisela Fredericks, the non-Indian accident victim, has long resided on the
Reservation, and was "hence an imbedded member of the community with a
recognizable social and economic value to the tribal community."5' She is
the widow of a deceased tribal member, Kenneth Fredericks, and mother to

their five children. All five of her adult children claimed tribal membership."
Further, Mrs. Fredericks owned property located on the Reservation.
A-1 Contractors operated a non-Indian owned subcontracting company

located off the Reservation in Dickinson, North Dakota. At the time of the
accident, A-1 Contractors was performing work on the Reservation under a

$12,400 subcontract agreement for LCM, a corporation wholly owned by the
*Tribe. In the contract, A-1 agreed to be bound by the tribal building codes,
employment rights codes and the regulations and directives of applicable
governing authorities.' Lyle Stockert, a non-Indian, was part owner of A-1

Contractors and an employee. A-1 Contractors performed certain tasks
relating to the excavating, berming and recompacting work in association with

the construction of the Twin Buttes tribal community center, all within the
Reservation boundaries.
On November 9, 1990, a two-vehicle collision occurred on the Fort
Berthold Indian Reservation. Stockert, while operating a gravel truck owned
by A-1 Contractors, collided with the vehicle driven by Gisela Fredericks.

Mrs. Frederick's extensive injuries required hospitalization for twenty-four
days, incurring medical bills in the amount of $30,000.

49. Id. at *4-5.
50. Id. at *5-6. A State police officer possesses the authority to issue a citation for a
violation on this stretch of highway. If a BIA staff person or a tribal police officer issues a
criminal traffic citation, then the subsequent prosecution would occur in State court if a nonIndian perpetrator was involved. When a civil traffic offense arises, such as speeding and open
containers-punishable by fine, the violator, whether Indian or non-Indian, must answer to the
tribal court, even when cited by non-tribal or non-Federal law enforcement. Id. at *5-7.
51. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 76 F.3d 930, 940 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc), aJ'd, 117 S. Ct.
1404 (1997).
52. Lyndon Benedict Fredericks, Kenneth Lee Fredericks, Paul Jonas Fredericks, Hans
Christian Fredericks, and Jeb Pius Fredericks,
53. Strate v. A-I Contractors, Civ. No. AI-92-24, 1992 WL 696330, at *4 (D.N.D. Sept. 16,
1992), afjd, No 92-3359, 1994 WL 666051 (8th Cir. Nov. 29, 1994), rev'd en bane, 76 F.3d 930
(8th Cir. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
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VI. The Legal History of Strate v. A-I Contractors

In May 1991, Mrs. Fredericks and her five adult children instituted an
action in the Tribal Court of the Three Affiliated Tribes5 against Stockert
and A-1 Contractors," seeking damages for personal injury (Mrs. Fredericks)
and loss of consortium (children), exceeding $13 million." A-1 Contractors
subsequently entered a special appearance and moved to dismiss based upon
lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction.'

54. Pursuant to the Tribal Constitution, the Tribe established its own tribal court. Petitioner's
Brief, at *3, Strate v. A-i Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997) (No. 95-1872), available in 1996
WL 656356 (citing CONST. & BY-LAWS OF THE THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES art. IV, § 3). The
tribal court is financed by the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 450-450n, with supplementing funds from the Tribe. The Tribe adopted and the Secretary of
the Interior approved a code of laws under which the tribal court functions. Id. (citing Tribal
Business Council, Resolution 82-192 (Oct. 22, 1982)).
55. These parties will be subsequently referred to collectively as A-I Contractors.
56. Strate, 1992 WL 696330, at *1.
57. One noted scholar described the issues of personal and subject matter jurisdiction as
follows:
Personal jurisdiction, the authority to bring a particular defendant before a court,
is not at issue in this case. Rather, the case potentially involves two other kinds
of jurisdiction: (1) civil adjudicatory jurisdiction, sometimes known as subject
matter jurisdiction, the authority to decide a particular type of case; and (2)
regulatory or legislative jurisdiction, the authority to apply a state's or tribe's law
to conduct occurring within the state or tribe.
Newton, supra note 4.
The applicable tribal code provisions involved in the instant case are set out below:
Chapter 1, Section 3: Jurisdiction of the Courts
Subsection 3. 2 - Jurisdiction - Territorial
The jurisdiction of the court shall extend to any and all lands and territory
within the Reservation boundaries, including all easements, fee patented lands,
rights of way; and over land outside the Reservation boundaries held in trust for
Tribal members or the Tribe.
Subsection 3.3 - Jurisdiction - Personal
Subject to any limitations or restrictions imposed by the constitution or laws
of the United States, the Court shall have civil and criminal jurisdiction over all
persons who reside, enter, or transact business within the territorial boundaries of
the reservation; provided that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians shall extend
as permitted by case law.
Subsection 3.5 - Jurisdiction - Subject Matter
The Court shall have jurisdiction over all civil causes of action arising within
the exterior boundaries of the Reservation, and over all criminal offenses which
are enumerated in this Code, and which are committed within the exterior
boundaries of the Reservation.
Chapter 2, Section 3(f): Long Arm Statute
Any person subject to the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court during any of the
following acts:
1) The transaction of any business of the Reservation;
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The tribal court denied the motion to dismiss for three reasons. First, Mrs.
Fredericks was a resident of the Fort Berthold Indian community with the
right to avail herself of the tribal court system. Second, the "consensual"
business relationship between A-I contractors and the tribe made jurisdiction
proper over A-1 Contractors. Third, no federal law, treaty or constitutional
provisions precluded an exercise of jurisdiction.
Appeals from the tribal court are taken to the Northern Plains Intertribal
Court of Appeals. After an adverse finding in the tribal court, A-1 Contractors
appealed the jurisdictional finding to the intertribal appeals court, which
affirmed the lower court's ruling. The court of appeals then remanded the case
for further proceedings consistent with their ruling.
Before any further action occurred in the tribal court, A-I Contractors filed
an action in the United States District Court for District of North Dakota on
September 16, 1992. A-1 Contractors named the Fredericks and the tribal
parties as defendants." A-1 Contractors sought a declaratory judgment that
the tribal court lacked jurisdiction and injunctive relief prohibiting any further
action in the tribal court. All parties moved for summary judgment,
whereupon the Honorable Patrick A. Conmy, Chief Judge, found summary
judgment was an appropriate disposition of the matter and granted both the
Fredericks' and the tribal parties' motions."
On June 16, 1993, A-1 appealed to United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit. A three-judge panel, in a 2-1 opinion, decided in favor of the
Fredericks and the tribal parties, thereby affirming the district court's ruling.
A-1 Contractors raised only one issue, whether the tribal court could exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over Fredericks' claimt ' Judge McMillian &rafted
the majority opinion with Judge Floyd R. Gibson joining, and Judge Hansen
dissenting.6

2) The commission of any act which results in accrual of a tort action within
the Reservation;
3) The ownership, use or possession of any property, or any interest therein,
situated within the Reservation.
Strate, 1992 WL 696330, at *4.
58. See supra note 2 and the discussion therein.
59. S'rate, 1992 WL 696330, at *2.
60. Petitioner's Brief at *5 n.3, Strate v. A-i Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997) (No. 951872), available in 1996 WL 656356.
The. issue of personal jurisdiction of the Tribal Court over A-I was raised in and
reached by the Tribal Court (citation omitted), the Tribal Court of Appeals
(citation omitted), and the federal district court (citation omitted). All of these
courts found that the Tribal Court has personal jurisdiction over A-I. Before the
Court of Appeals, A-I raised only the issue of subject matter, not personal,
jurisdiction (citation omitted).

Id.
61. See A-I Contractors v. Strate, No. 92-3359, 1994 WL 666051, at *1 (8th Cir. Nov. 29,
1994), rev'd en banc, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996), affld, 117 S. Ct. (1997).
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Upon A-l's request, the Eighth Circuit decided to rehear the case en
bane.' In an 8-4 decision, the Court reversed the judgment of the district
court and determined that the tribal court did not possess subject matter
jurisdiction. Judge Hansen authored the majority opinion, joined by Judges
Richard S. Arnold, Fagg, Bowman, Wollman, Magill, Loken, and Morris
Shepard Arnold, with Judges McMillian, Floyd R. Gibson, Beam and Murphy
dissenting.
On May 16, 1996, the Fredericks and the tribal parties petitioned for a writ
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.'

62. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc), affd, 117 S. Ct. 1404
(1997).
63. Four amicus curiae briefs were filed in support of the Fredericks and the tribal parties.
First,the United States authored an opinion supporting the petitioners, a fact that did not tip the
balance in favor of tribal jurisdiction. United States Supreme Court Amicus Brief of the United
States in Support of the Petitioner, Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997) (No. 951872), available in 1996 WL 666742. Deputy Solicitor General Jonathan E. Nuechterlein argued
before the United States Supreme Court on their behalf. One of the major themes from the
opinion dealt with a tribal court's exercise of adjudicatory jurisdiction. The "courts of one
sovereign often adjudicate disputes using the substantive law of another sovereign. That practice
reflects the constitutional principle that a sovereign's adjudicatory jurisdiction commonly exceeds
its power to impose substantive rules of conduct." l at *20-21.
Sezond, the Northern Plains Tribal Judges Association wrote a very nice and succinct piece.
United States Supreme Court Amicus Brief of the Northern Plains Tribal Judges Association in
Support of the Petitioner, Strate (No. 95-1872), availablein 1996 WL 658740. This organization
of tribal judges from North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, and Nebraska represents twentyfive tribal court systems. Id. at *1. The Tribal Judges Association was particularly concerned
with their ability to perform their duties if the lower court's decision was upheld. "The Court
below has emasculated the ability of tribal courts to provide remedies for both Indians and nonIndians in routine domestic relations cases, tort actions, consumer matters and other disputes that
are brought before tribal courts on a daily basis." Language espoused in the en bane decision also
caused a deep concern to arise.
Throughout the lower court's opinion the terms non-Indian and non-member are
used almost interchangeably. For example, the Court below announces the tribal
court subject matter jurisdiction rule of an Indian tribal court as follows: "a valid
tribal interest must be at issue before a tribal court may exercise civil jurisdiction
over a non-Indian or nonmember ...

."

This rule is announced despite the fact

that this case does not involve the question of a tribal court's jurisdiction over nonmember Indians from other Tribes.
Id. at *9.
Third, due to the increased business activities and other economic endeavors occurring on
their Reservations, the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation, Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Reservation, Ho-Chunk Nation, St. Croix Band of Chippewa Indians and
the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe co-sponsored a supporting brief. United States Supreme Court
Amicus Brief of the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation, et al., in Support
of the Petitioner, Strate (No. 95-1872), available in 1996 WL 658760. Among their many
concerns, the one concerning the limitation of the sovereign's ability to govern was expressed best
by the following:
Accidents on highways implicate the interests of a government in promoting safety
on its roads for all who use them. An accident may highlight other social
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VII. The Decisions
A. The District Court Decision
The district court, referring generally to Iowa Mutual Insurance, held that
tribal courts possess civil jurisdiction over non-Indians unless specifically
restricted by treaty or federal statute.' In this case, the court declared, such
a limitation over civil causes of action arising on the reservation had not
occurred.' The court relying on Oliphant" concluded that tribal civil
jurisdiction had not been similarly limited, and determined that "the
development of the principles governing civil jurisdiction have been different
than those governing criminal jurisdiction."' The tribal code clearly provided

problems that concern the sovereign, such as high rates of drug or alcohol use
among drivers, underage drivers, or uninsured drivers. The may also indicate a
need for safety belt laws, child restraint requirements, or modifications in the roads
or road signage. Accidents also implicate the government's interest because they
frequently require governmental services to address the effects of such accidents.
The injured may require ambulance services, medical attention, or other services.
Id. at *13.
Fourth, many other Tribes expressed concern about this case because it may affect their own
tribal court systems. The Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux (Dakota) Community, SissetonWahpeton Sioux Tribe, Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe and Red Lake Band of Chippewa joined to
support the petitioners. United States Supreme Court Amicus Brief of the Shakopee
Midewakanton Sioux (Dakota) Community, et al., in Support of the Petitioner, Strate (No. 951872), available in 1996 WL 658737. All of these Tribe's possess their own tribal courts and
exercise general civil jurisdiction. For this reason, the Tribes stated,
Unsafe conduct of this sort has the potential to damage property or injure or kill
people on the Reservation, ,vhether those people are tribal members, nonmember
residents, or visitors to the Reservation. . . . The Eighth Circuit's decision
establishes a rule whereby a nonmember driving negligently on the Reservation
who hits and injures a tribal member is subject to Tribal Court jurisdiction, but a
nonmember driving negligently on the Reservation who hits and injures a
nonmember escapes the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court. The conduct at issue negligent driving - is the same in each case, yet the Tribal Court's authority to
address the conduct is determined by the status of the victim.
Id. at *8.
64. Strate v. A-I Contractors, Civ. No. Al-92-24, 1992 WL 696330, at *5 (D.N.D. Sept. 16,
1992), affd, No. 92-3359, 1994 WL 666051 (8th Cir. Nov. 29, 1994), rev'd en banc, 76 F.3d 930
(8th Cir. 1996), aff'd, 117 S.Ct. 1404 (1997).
65. it.
66. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Oliphant precluded Tribes
from exercising criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because such jurisdiction had been
preempted by congressional action granting the federal courts jurisdiction. Id. at 204.
67. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, Civ. No. AI-92-94, 1992 WL 696330, at *3 (D.N.D. Sept. 16,
1992) (citing National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855
(1985) (refusing to extend Oliphantto case involving tribal civil jurisdiction)), affd,No. 92-3359,
1994 WL 66051 (8th Cir. Nov. 29, 1994), rev'd en banc, 76 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1996), affd, 117
S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
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for personal and subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, the tribal court
could properly exercise both.
B. The First Three-JudgeAppellate Court Decision
First, the three-judge appellate court held that it was not erroneous for the
district court to determine that the tribal court had subject matter
jurisdiction.' Second, the court held that Montana, and the Montana
exceptions, were not applicable to the case at bar." Dismissing the Montana
exceptions as inapplicable, the court proclaimed that the general divestiture
of general civil jurisdiction as found in Montana related only to fee land
owned by non-Indians, a circumstance not found here.
The court addressed two other issues. The first regarded the exhaustion of
tribal remedies, and the second issue involved federal court abstention. The
tribal remedies had been exhausted, thereby benefitting the three-judge
appellate court because they now had advantage of the tribal court's expertise
and analysis."' As a result of the policies expressed in Iowa Mutual
Insurance' and National Farmers Union,' this additional benefit correlated
to the federal government's long-standing policy of supporting tribal selfgovernment, including tribal courts and self-determination.
An explicit finding of no limiting treaty provision or federal statute allowed
a conclusion that the tribal court's exercise of civil jurisdiction over nonIndians in Indian country had not been restricted. ' Thus, the court was able
to reason,"'[c]ivil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the
tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or
federal statute."75
In the alternative under the Montana analysis, the panel determined that
both exceptions had been met. First, a consensual relationship existed because
of the subcontract." Second, the tribe had an important and legitimate
interest in protecting the health and safety of its members and residents on the
roads and highways within the Reservation."

at *5.
68. Id.
69. Strate v. A-I Contractors, No. 92-3359, 1994 WL 666051, at *2 (8th Cir. Nov. 29,
1994), rev'd en banc, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996), afftd 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).

70. 1&
71. Id.at *4.
72. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987).
73. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985).
74. Strate, 1994 WL 666051, at *5.

75. Id.(citations omitted).
at *5.
76. Id.
77. Id.at *6.
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C. The Second En Banc Appellate Court Decision
A-1 Contractors, displeased by the three-judge appellate court's decision,
appealed to the Second Circuit for an en banc ruling. The en bane appellate
court held that the tribe does not retain the inherent sovereign power to
exercise subject matter jurisdiction. 8 The court announced that the standards
articulated in Montane9 governed the outcome of this case, along with the
subsequent cases utilizing those standards.' The tribal court could not
exercise jurisdiction unless the Fredericks' and the tribal parties could
establish a tribal interest under either one of the Montana exceptions."' Iowa
Mutual insurance,NationalFarmersUnion, and Williams v. Lee, and Merrion
v. JicarillaApache Tribe' did not support the contentions of the Fredericks'
and the tribal parties.' Iowa Mutual Insurance only discussed tribal
exhaustion, nothing more. "Hence, Iowa Mutual should not be read to expand
the category of activities which Montana described as giving rise to tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians or nonmembers. Instead, we read it within the
parameters of Montana.""
In an almost indecipherable and somewhat circular argument, the court
determined that Montana specifically broadened the general principles
underlying Oliphant' to civil jurisdiction.' "Thus, when National Farmers
Union state[d] that civil tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers [was] not
foreclosed by Oliphant, that observation [was] perfectly consistent with
Montana, which provides for broader tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians than
does Oliphant." Furthermore, the court found that Williams v. Lee fit
squarely with the consensual agreement exception because Montana
specifically cited to Williams when creating the two exceptions."

78. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 76 F.3d 930, 940 (8th Cir. 1996) (en bane), aff'd, 117 S. Ct.
1404 (1997).
79. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
80. Strate, 76 F.3d at 934.

81. I. at 935.
82. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). Merrion is the seminal case on tribal taxation of non-Indian
activities on a reservation, wherein the Court concluded that ."Indian tribes within 'Indian country'
are a good deal more than 'private, voluntary organizations.'" Id. at 140-41. They "are unique
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory." Id.
Also, "the Tribe's authority to tax non-Indians who conduct business on the reservation does not
simply derive from the Tribe's power to exclude such person, but is an inherent power necessary
to tribal self-government and territorial management." Id.
83. Strate, 76 F.3d at 935.
84. Id. at 936.
85. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribes, 435 U.S. 191 (1987).

86. Strate, 76 F.3d at 937.
87. Id.
88. Id. The court stated that the Fredericks and the tribal parties also placed too much
emphasis (n the footnote in Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 n.14 (1982).
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The en banc appellate court asserted that Montana and Brendale did not
limit their discussions or rationales to only jurisdictional issues arising on fee
lands." Rather, "Montana explicitly addressed the authority of tribes to
exercise civil jurisdiction on the reservation, as well as on non-Indian fee
lands."' The court, therefore, concluded that any effort to limit Montana and
Brendale to fee land jurisdictional issues was not supported by either one of
these cases.9
Next, a discussion ensued concerning the distinctions between the Iowa
Mutual Insurance tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction line of cases versus the
Montana tribal regulatory jurisdiction line of cases. The court noted that this
distinction did appear in some commentaries, irregardless such a "distinction
[did] not appear explicitly, or even implicitly, anywhere in the case law."'
However, in Montana and those line of cases involving regulatory jurisdiction,
nothing suggests that their reasoning was limited to a consideration of tribal
authority being regulatory in nature. Actually, those cases involved civil
jurisdiction in broad and unqualified terms 3 The en banc court went on to
suggest that "some of the language in Iowa Mutual, Williams, and Merrion
can be viewed in isolation to create tension with Montana.""
All of these cases read together established one broad, comprehensive
scheme:
[A] valid tribal interest must be at issue before a tribal court may
exercise civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian or nonmember, but
once the tribal interest is established, a presumption arises that
tribal courts have jurisdiction over the non-Indian or nonmember
unless that jurisdiction is affirmatively limited by federal law.

The Court made the observation in isolation in a case dealing with the tribe's
authority to impose a severance tax on non-Indians on the reservation. The Court
found this taxation power was derived either from the tribe's inherent power of
self-government or the power to exclude.., both of which are consistent with the
inherent powers the tribe retains over nonmembers described in Montana. Both
Merrion and Iowa Mutual say essentially the same thing: the inherent attributes
of sovereignty that an Indian tribe retains, which under Montana are very limited
when dealing with non-Indians, remain intact unless affirmatively limited by the
federal government.
Strate, 76 F.3d at 937 (emphasis added).
89. Strate, 76 F.3d at 937.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 938.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. ld.
95. Id.
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D. The Supreme Court Decision
On April 28, 1997, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's ruling, in one of the most anti-Indian and deleterious decisions of
recent vintage." The court declared that tribal courts may not exercise
jurisdiction when an accident occurs on a public highway maintained by the
State pursuant to a federally granted right-of-way over Indian reservation
land" Indeed, the Supreme Court maintained that a nonmember civil action
of this type fell under the state or federal regulatory and adjudicatory
governance." Hence, absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern
the conduct of nonmembers driving on the State's highways, the tribal court
was without authority to act." The Court made clear, however, that they
were not addressing the issue of the governing law or proper forum when an
accident arises on a tribal road within a reservation."®
The Court relied on three basic premises to justify its decision. First,
absent express authorization by federal statute or treaty, tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers' 'conduct exists only in limited circumstances.''
Second,
Montana controlled the disposition of this case, and neither Iowa Mutual nor
National Farmersestablished a rule contrary to Montana." Third, the rightof-way North Dakota acquired resembled and was equivalent to, for
nonmember governance purposes, non-Indian owned land within the
reservation."w
Prior to beginning their legal analysis, the Court reiterated a fact
completely superfluous to the issue at hand, "'the state forum is physically
much closer by road to the accident scene . . . than [was] the tribal
courthouse.""' Citing to Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe"°S for the proposition
of limited tribal jurisdiction over the conduct of nonmembers, the Court, thus,
leads into their discussion of Montana v. United States." As a general rule,
Montana only established that Indian tribes lack civil authority over the
conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within the reservation, subject to
the two exceptions."7 The Court went on to address the petitioner's

96. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997). Justice Ginsberg delivered the
opinion of the unanimous Court.
97. Id'
at 1407.
98. Id at 1407-08.
99. Id at 1408.
100. Id
101. Id
102. Id at 1409.
103. Id at 1410.
104. Id at 1413.
105. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
106. 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1411.
107. Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1413.
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209

argument that Montana did not apply to the case at bar by discussing National
Farmers and Iowa Mutual." "NationalFarmers and Iowa Mutual... are
not at odds with, and do not displace, Montana. Both decisions describe an
exhaustion rule allowing tribal courts initially to respond to an invocation of
their jurisdiction; neither establishes tribal-court adjudicatory authority, even
over the lawsuits involved in those eases. ' 1°9
The general rule and the exceptions announced in Montana only apply in
the absence of a delegation of tribal authority by treaty or statute. Nothing
more may be extracted from National Farmers than this: "a prudential
exhaustion rule, in deference to the capacity of tribal courts 'to explain to the
parties the precise basis for accepting [or rejecting] jurisdiction.""
An examination of Iowa Mutual followed to show that the exhaustion rule
pronounced in National Farmers was a prudential rule, not a jurisdictional
rule, based on comity."' The statement relied on heavily by the petitioners
and the United States that "civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively
lies in the tribal courts,""' did not limit the Montana rule. Rather, it only
stood for the unremarkable proposition that in such cases where nonmembers
enter into consensual relationships with the tribe or tribal members, or where
the on-reservation activity of nonmembers affects the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe, then civil jurisdiction
presumptively lies within the tribal courts."'
The Court held that absent congressional direction enlarging tribal-court
jurisdiction, as to nonmembers, a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not
exceed its legislative jurisdiction."' "Subject to controlling provisions in
treaties and statutes, and the two exceptions identified in Montana, the civil
authority of Indian tribes and their courts, with respect to non-Indian fee
lands, generally 'does not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the
tribe.""' 5

108. Id. at 1410.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1411 (citing National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 857
(1985)). Also, referred to was a footnote from NationalFarmers indicating that exhaustion was
not an unyielding requirement:
We do not suggest that exhaustion would be required where an assertion of tribal
jurisdiction 'is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith,' or

where the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or
where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity
to challenge the court's jurisdiction.
Id. at 1411 n.7 (citing NationalFarmers,471 U.S. at 856 n.21 (citation omitted)).

111. Id.at 1411.
112. Id. at 1412 (citing Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18).

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1413 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)).
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The next argument confronted by the Court involved the assertion that
Montana did not pertain to this case because the land underlying the scene of
the accident was trust land." 6 It was decided that Montana applied because
the Court equated the right-of-way at issue with land alienated to non-Indians
within the reservation."7 Furthermore, the authority of tribal police officers
to patrol roads within the reservation, including the rights-of-way made part
of a state highway, was severely restricted."' A painful conciliatory
revelation was made that the tribal police only possess the power to detain
and tuni over to state officers nonmembers stopped on the highway for
conduct violating state law."9
To prevail, the petitioner had to fulfill the two Montana exceptions. The
petitioners failed to meet this burden under either exception to the Court's
satisfaction. The kinds of cases that fell under the first Montana exception,
a consensual relationship, comprise the following: the on-reservation sales
transaction between nonmember plaintiffs and member defendants," tribal
permit tax on nonmember-owned livestock within reservation boundaries,"
tribal permit tax on nonmembers for the privilege of conducting business
within reservation borders,' " and the tribal tax of on-reservation cigarette
sales to nonmembers."
These type of cases also reflect the category of nonmember activities
contemplated by the second Montana exception." Nonmembers who
recklessly drive on such a road endanger all in the area, and undoubtedly
imperil the security and safety of tribal members. "But if Montana's second
exception requires no more, the exception would severely shrink the rule."
The Court concluded with the following pronouncement in footnote 14:
When ...it is plain that no federal grant provided for tribal
governance of nonmembers' conduct on land covered by
Montana's main rule, it will be equally evident that tribal courts
lack adjudicatory authority over disputes arising from such
conduct. As in criminal proceedings, state or federal courts will
be the only forums competent to adjudicate those disputes. Therefore, when tribal-court jurisdiction over an action such as this one
is challenged in federal court, the otherwise applicable exhaustion

116. Id.
117. ld. at 1414.
118. Id.
at 1414 n.11.
119. Id.
120. 1&at 1415 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)).
121. I. (citing Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904)).
122. h/(citing Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905)).
123. Id. (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 152-54 (1980)).
124. Ma at *35.
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requirement must give way, for it would serve no purpose other
than delay.'
VIII. Analysis

A. Why Montana Differs Theoretically
Montana is inapplicable to Strate v. A-i Contractorsbecause of the vast
differences between tribal adjudicatory and regulatory authority. Tribal
adjudicatory authority concerns the power of a tribal court to decide a
particular type of case. Whereas, tribal regulatory authority stems from the
application of tribal laws to the facts of the case." Montana and the cases
employing a similar line of reasoning are simply incompatible with Strate.
The regulatory cases concerned issues intricately tied to non-Indian owned
land and the regulation thereof by the tribes. Montana and Brendale simply
establish a premise based upon land formerly owned by the tribe. That is,
once an Indian tribe conveys its land to non-Indians, the former right of
absolute and exclusive use and occupation of the conveyed lands was lost.
"The general divestiture of tribal civil jurisdiction over the activities of nonIndians recognized in Montana is applicable only to fee lands owned by non-

Indians."' 7
It is not an unusual occurrence for the court of one state to apply the law
of another under choice-of-law rules, nor is it peculiar for adjoining states to
possess concurrent jurisdiction over a matter." Citizens of one state travel

125. Id. at 1416 n.14 (citations omitted).
126. Newton, supra note 4.
127. A-I Contractors v. Strate, Civ. No. Al-92-94, 1992 WL 696330, at *4 (D.N.D. Sep.
16, 1992), affid, No. 92-3359, 1994 WL 666051 (8th Cir. Nov. 29, 1994), rev'd en banc, 76 F.3d
930 (8th Cir. 1996), affid, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
128. Oral Argument Transcript for Tuesday, Jan. 7, 1997, at *21-*30, Strate v. A-I
Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997) (No. 95-1872), available in 1997 WL 10398 (Jonathan E.
Nuechterlein on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae).
One of the Court's primary concerns discussed in Strate was the unavailability of appellate
review. Id. at *22-*23. No review process of tribal court decisions exists, either in the federal
court or the Supreme Court. As a matter of comity, the federal court might exercise a review.
The tribes and states use the legal principle of comity to enforce foreign judgments as a matter
of courtesy and respect rather than an as obligatory right. Hon. William D. Johnson, Honor and
Respect: Recognition and Enforcement of CourtJudgments in Indian Country, in TRIBAL COURT
RECORD, Spring/Summer 1996, at 29, 32. To date, no common law or federal statute authorizes
such appellate jurisdiction. Congress also prohibits sister states from challenging the first State's
choice of law in a collateral attack under the Due Process, U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I, and
Full Faith and Credit Clauses, U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 1, of the Constitution. Although if a valid
basis for the action exists, then Due Process will not enable review of every such collateral attack.
Congress needs to address this issue to advance their espoused policy of tribal court promotion.
The implementing statute for the Full Faith and Credit Clause is 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994),
which requires: "Such... judicial proceedings ...shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or
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through other states frequently with the understanding that such conduct
makes them subject to that sovereign's laws. No distinction should arise when
such activity leads them into reservation boundaries. In the instant case, a
sign had been posted alerting travellers that they were entering the reservation.
This should function as sufficient notice for all concerned. Prohibiting tribal
court jurisdiction emasculates the ability of the tribal police to effectively
patrol and enforce the relevant laws against violators. At the very least,
concurrent jurisdiction ought to exist between the tribe and the state.
B. How Montana Differs Factually

The Supreme Court strained to apply Montana; however, the facts do not
support its contentions. By equating the right-of-way, only a limitedeasement,
with the non-Indian owned fee land at issue in Montana, Brendale, and
Bourland, the Court struggled to thrust this case into the general rule of
Montana. The road operated as a BIA gravel service road to the tribal
headquarters. The federal water resource project under control of the Army
Corp of Engineers forced the tribal headquarters to move. Also, as a result,
existing Indian communities were isolated. Due to this isolation, the tribe
desired to have this road paved. Indeed, Highway 8 does not even function
as a major thoroughfare.
According to the Court, this road, along with the right-of-way, was created
only for access to the federal water resource project. The facts simply do not
support this contention! The Court went on to further reason that the "rightof-way (was] open to the public, and traffic on it [was] subject to State
control. The Tribes have consented to, and received payment for, the State's
use of the 6.59-mile stretch for a public highway. They have retained no
gatekeeping right."'29 Noticeably absent from the Court's factual summation
were the facts leading up to the tribe's displacement, isolation and reasons for
acquiescing to the limited easement.
Foremost, this road was paved for access to the isolated Indian
communities, and then for accessibility to the federal water resource project.
Therefore, the Court's alignment of the right-of-way with land alienated to
non-Indians should not suffice to skirt around Montana, Brendale, and
Bourland. Hence, Montana should not apply using this land-based approach,
as the government still held the land underlying the right-of-way in trust for
the Tribe. Furthermore, this factual narration appeared more in line with the
usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken." Under the
Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994), Professor Robert Clinton argues that tribal
court judgments fall within the meaning of "territories and possessions," and, therefore, such
judgments should receive full faith and credit and recognize foreign judgments accordingly.
Johnson, supra, at 32 n.13 (citing Robert N. Clinton, Full Faith and Credit, Comity and Tribal
Courts, Address Before the Judicial Conference, National American Indian Court Judges
Association (Apr. 1996)).
129. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1414 (1997).
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dual tribal and state rules and regulations applicable to the highway. The BIA,
tribe, and state police all take responsibility for enforcing the relevant rules
and regulations and patrolling the highway, with the BIA and the tribe acting
as the primary enforcers.
The Court further declared that absent a statute or treaty authorizing the
tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers driving on the State's highways,
the tribal court lacked the authority to act. However, Congress has repeatedly
implemented broad mandates relating to Indian people, which the Court
obviously ignored in Strate, signaling that the tribe not only should have, but
must have, general civil jurisdiction to survive as a politically self-sufficient
entity. Additionally, congressional action should not even be necessary, as the
tribes retain all those inherent powers not expressly revoked. However, since
the Strate Court decided otherwise, Congress must now enact legislation
authorizing tribal jurisdiction over accidents.
C. CongressionalAffirmation of the Tribal Courts
Beginning with the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934,' Congress
sought to encourage tribal entities to rebuild, thus "laying the foundation for
Indian tribal governments after years of domination by the federal
government." '' Congress' intent was to protect the tribe's political integrity
and powers of self-governance. Under the IRA, many tribes adopted
constitutions or organized pursuant to their inherent sovereign power. Tribes
set up their own court systems and code of laws or elected to remain under
32
the Bureau of Indian Affairs Courts of Indian Offenses (CFR Courts).'
In 1975, the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act'
was enacted. This Act has been the cornerstone of the Federal Government's
Indian policy for over two decades. The tribes were given the authority to
contract with the federal government to operate programs serving their tribal
members." Self-determination promotes the tribal operation of federal
programs and services administered by the BIA and the Indian Health
Service.'35

130. Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 461-479 (1994)).
131. ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 366 (3d ed. 1991).
132. TRIBAL COURT HANDBOOK:

FOR THE 26 FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED TRIBES IN

WASHINGTON STATE at 2 (Prof. Ralph W. Johnson & Rachael Paschal eds., 2d ed. 1992).
133. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450a (1994)).
134. Indian Self-Determination & EducationAssistance Act: Oversight HearingBefore the
Subcomm. on Native American Affairs of the House Comm. on Natural Resources on the
Implementation of the IndianSelf-DeterminationAct, and Development of RegulationsFollowing
Passage of the 1988 Amendments to the Act, 103d Cong. 33 (1994) (prepared statement of Sen.
John McCain) [hereinafter 1994 Oversight Hearing].
135. Id.
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The origins of Self-Determination, more commonly referred to as P.L. 93638 or "638", can be traced back to President Nixon's 1970 "Special Message
to the Congress on Indian Affairs" which stated:
For years we have talked about encouraging Indians to exercise
greater self-determination, but our progress has never been
commensurate with our promises. Part of the reason for this
situation has been the threat of termination. But another reason is
the fact that when a decision is made as to whether a federal
program will be turned over to Indian administration, it is the
federal authorities and not the Indian people who finally make
that decision.
This situation should be reversed. In my judgment, it should
be up to the Indian tribe to determine whether it is willing to
as;ume administrative responsibility for a service program which
is presently administered by a federal agency."
In 1974, Congress responded to President Nixon's message by passing the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act. This Act was signed
into law by President Ford on January 4, 1975.""
The Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project was first authorized by
the 1987 Amendments to Public Law 93-638.' This Demonstration Project
applied only to the Department of the Interior. Considered an experimental
approach, self-governance increased the tribes' flexibility and authority in the
administration of programs, services, activities or functions previously
performed for the tribe by federal employees.' In 1994, Congress made the
Self-Governance permanent for the Department of the Interior under Title IV,
known as the Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994."
The statute of most recent import signifying Congress' intent to promote
tribal court systems is the Indian Tribal Justice Act of 1993.' 4' The dire
needs of the tribal court justice systems spurred the enactment of this

136. Id. at 34.
137. S. REP. No. 374, 103rd Cong. 2 (1994).
138. S. REP. No. 392, 102d Cong. 42 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3943, 398485. For a more in-depth discussion of the self-governance issue, see Tadd M. Johnson & James
Hamilton, Self-Governancefor Indian Tribes: From Paternalismto Empowerment, 27 CONN. L.
REv. 1251 (1995).
139. Statement of Sen. John McCain, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs (Federal
Documents Clearing House, Inc. May 2, 1995), available in 1995 WL 253279 (supporting tribal
self-governance generally).
140. 'he 1994 Amendments to the Indian Self-Determination Act included the Tribal Self-

governance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, tit. 2, §§ 201-204, tit. 4, §§ 401-408, 108 Stat.
4250, 4270, 4272.
141. Pub. L. No. 103-76, 107 Stat. 2004 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994)).
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legislation. 4' This act authorized the appropriation of more than $50 million
over a seven year period to support the tribal courts. 43
Janet Reno, in 1994, issued a statement pertaining to the Department of
Justice' position in regard to the tribal justice systems:
The Department is committed to strengthening and assisting
Indian tribal governments in their development and promoting
Indian self-governance. Consistent with federal law and
Departmental responsibilities, the Department will consult with

tribal governments concerning law enforcement priorities in Indian
country, support duly recognized tribal governmental powers in
coordination with the Department of Interior and other federal

agencies, investigate government corruption when necessary, and
support and assist Indian tribes in the development of their law
enforcement systems, tribal courts, and traditional justice
systems." 4

142. Hon. William C. Canby, Jr., Tribal Courts, Viewedfrom a FederalJudge'sPerspective,

TRIBAL COURT RECORD, Spring/Summer 1996, at 15, 17. To date, Congress had never
appropriated the money. ld.
143. Id. During oral argument, Nuechterlein argued that the "Indian Tribal Justice Act, which
commits essential Federal resources to the development of tribal courts on the premise embraced
by this Court in Iowa Mutual that tribal jurisdiction over events arising on a reservation
presumptively does lie in tribal court." Oral Argument Transcript for Tuesday, Jan. 7, 1997, at
*25, Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997) (No. 95-1872), available in 1997 WL
10398 (arguments before United States Supreme Court).
144. Janet Reno, A Federal Commitment to Tribal Justice Systems, 79 JUDICATURE 113 n.3

(1995). This statement was made pursuant to President Clinton's 1994 mandate requiring federal
agencies to deal with Indian governments on a government-to-government basis when treaty or
tribal govemment rights are in contention. 1 PUB. PAPERS 800-03 (1994).
In every relationship between our people, our first principle must be to respect
your right to remain who you are, and to live the way you wish to live. And I
believe the best way to do that is to acknowledge the unique government-togovernment relationship we have enjoyed over time. Today I reaffirm our
commitment to self-determination for tribal governments.
This then is our first principle - respecting your values, your religions, your
identity and your sovereignty. This brings us to the second principle that should
guide our relationship. We must dramatically improve the federal government's
relationships with the tribes and become full partners with the tribal nations.
I don't want there to be any mistake about our commitment to a stronger
partnership between our people. Therefore, in a moment, I will also sign an
historic government directive that requires every executive department and agency
of government to take two simple steps: first, to remove all barriers that prevent
them from working directly with tribal governments; and second, to make certain
that if they take action affecting tribal resources, they consult with tribal
governments prior to that decision. It is the entire government, not simply the
Department of the Interior, that has a trust responsibility with tribal governments.
And it is time the entire government recognized and honored that responsibility.
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D. CongressionalLimitations on Tribal Expressions of Self-Government
When Congress has intended to permit a restraint on tribal self-government
and the punishment of offenses, it has done so specifically. Four statutes in
particular reflect this preemption of tribal authority by the assumption of
federal jurisdiction. The applicable statutes govern criminal jurisdiction and
are set out in sections 1151, 1152, 1153, and 13 of Title 18 of the United
States Code. A number of federal statutes that have nothing to do with any
of the above mentioned statutes will also govern conduct in Indian country
because federal jurisdiction will remain generally applicable everywhere. 45
Section 1151 gives the definition of Indian country. Three different types
of Indian country exist: reservations, dependent Indian communities, and
Indian allotments.'"
Section 1152 involves the Federal Enclaves, the General Crimes Act, and
the Interracial Crimes Act. Through section 1152, the body of federally
defined crimes now extends to Indian country, exclusive of state jurisdiction;
for example, the laws generally applicable to military bases and federal parks.
Five exceptions have arisen from the various twists and interpretations
given to this statute. First, this section does not apply to offenses of crimes
between Indians, generally referred to as intra-Indian crime. Second, due to
a judicially created exception in McBratney,'47 section 1152 does not reach
crimes between non-Indians committed upon Indian land. In such
circumstances, the state possesses exclusive jurisdiction. Third, if a defendant
has already been punished under tribal law, then the federal government has
no jurisdiction; a double jeopardy type of exception. However, federal
jurisdiction is not exclusive of the Tribe. Concurrent jurisdiction between the
Tribe and the federal government has been interpreted to apply only to

Presidentfs Remarks to American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Leaders, Apr. 29, 1994, 30
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 941,941-42 (May. 9, 1994), available in 1994 WL 157598, at *1-*2
(remarks by President Clinton in historic meeting with American Indian and Alaska Native tribal
leaders).
145. An example of this is the federal statute addressing treason.
146. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994). Specifically the statute says the following:
[The] term Indian country... means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government,
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including rights-of-way running
through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders

of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rightsoJ'way running through the same.

Id. (emphasis added). One should note that Indian country as defined in section 1151 includes
rights-of-way running through the reservation, which is exactly the issue we are confronted with
in Strate.
147. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881) (overturning federal court decision
for lack of jurisdiction for crime committed on reservation by two non-Indians).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss1/5

No. 1]

NOTES

defendants convicted in tribal court. If no conviction is obtained in tribal

court, then the federal government may proceed in a prosecution of the
individual. Fourth, exclusive tribal jurisdiction continues if it is set out by
treaty stipulation. This has little viability toady, as few treaties exist that
could arguably apply. The last exception concerns victimless/consensual
crime; the crime of adultery is an example of this exception.
Section 1153 denies tribal jurisdiction over fourteen listed offenses. This

section was enacted in 1885 in response to the Supreme Court decision in
Crow Dog.4" The Major Crimes Act extended federal jurisdiction, exclusive
of the states, to Indian defendants for those crimes enumerated in section 1153
and committed within Indian country as defined in section 1151.4"
The Assimilative Crimes Act 5 was designed to fill the gaps in the
federal statutory scheme. This Act incorporates lesser state crimes into section
1152 when such crimes are not defined by an enactment of Congress. This

only applies to interracial crimes. The federal courts retain jurisdiction but
utilize the applicable state law. Upon examination, an argument exists that the

Assimilative Crimes Act was never meant to apply to Indian country. 5'
Two relatively recent cases decided by the Supreme Court limited tribal

criminal misdemeanorjurisdiction over non-Indians and non-member Indians;
Oliphant" and Duro v. Reina. 3 In response to Duro, Congress amended

148. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (discussing the murder of an Indian by an
Indian in Indian country). Justice Brennan surmised that "it is implausible to conclude that
Congress did not consider the situation of intertribal crimes when passing the Indian Major
Crimes Act." Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 704 (1990).
149. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994). The statute lists the following offenses:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian
or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter,
kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to
commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious
bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an assault against an
individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, arson, burglary, robbery, and
a felony under section 661 of this title within Indian country, shall be subject to
the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above
offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
(b) Any offenses referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined
and punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the
State in which such offense was committed as are in force at the time of such
offense.
Id.
150. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994).
151. Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a
JurisdictionalMaze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 520-52 (1976), reprintedin ROBERT N. CLINTON ET
AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 282 (3d ed. 1991).
152. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (denying tribal court criminal
jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians).
153. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (determining that Indian tribes lack criminal
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Title 25 section 1301 of the United States Code, thereby affirming inherent
tribal powers to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians."
The tribes retain all the powers not limited by treaties, agreements, or
specific acts of Congress. It is clear that these inherent powers include the
right to exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians and non-member Indians
when such persons enter the territory under a tribe's control. Without this
basic right, the tribes' ability to maintain law and order within their territories
will be virtually paralyzed. This right is fundamental to their survival. The
Supreme Court shifted this presumption to that of non-jurisdiction absent an
express congressional statute or treaty granting such jurisdiction, which clearly
goes against one of the basic tenets underlying the inherent sovereignty
concept and stands in direct conflict with prevailing congressional policy.
Many of the tribal courts currently in existence originated from the 1934
Indian Reorganization Act. One expression of sovereignty arises from the
creation of tribal judicial systems." s In the last fifteen to twenty years, tribal
court systems have evolved and developed significantly." Many issues,
such as domestic relations, child custody, probate, tort, and criminal
prosecutions, may achieve a more satisfactory resolution in tribal judicial
systems because of their special strengths.' The methods utilized by tribal
courts should not be limited to only intra-tribal disputes. These methods lend
themselves to the resolution of conflicts "between one tribe and another, and
between a tribe and the State and Federal government, political units, private
investors, or contractors." ' As the role of the tribal courts proceeds to
develop, these courts have an "increasingly important role to play in the
administration of the laws of our nation."'59
Montana should not apply because of the differences previously mentioned
between regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction. However, if one must
proceed under the general rule of Montana, then an exception ought to exist

misdemeanor jurisdiction over nonmember Indians).
154. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1994). The relevant portion of the statute states:
"[P]owers of self-government" means and includes all governmental powers
pos.essed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices,
bodies and tribunals by and through which they are executed, including courts of
Indian offenses; and means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized
and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians ....
Id. § 1301(2).
155. Johnson, supra note 128, at 29.
156. H-on. Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessonsfrom the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts,
TRIBAL COURT RECORD,Spring/Summer 1996, at 12, 12.
157. Id. at 13. "The special strengths of the tribal courts - their proximity to the people
served, the closeness of the relations among the parties and the court, their often greater flexibility
and informality - give tribal courts special opportunities to develop alternative methods of
dispute resolution." Id.
158. /d.
159. I. at 14.
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to the strict non-Indian distinction. "Civil jurisdiction on the reservation is
almost entirely tribal. '" " Tribal courts possess civil jurisdiction in matters
involving Indians, and when incidents affect tribal interests.
It is presumed that tribes do not possess criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians because of the judicially created premise of Oliphant.6' As to civil
jurisdiction, the opposite presumption governs." That is, when the activities
of non-Indians affect the tribe's political integrity, economic security, or health
and welfare, then the tribe may properly exercise jurisdiction.'" However,
when such activity by non-Indians does not impact tribal interests, then the
"If two non-Indians, for
tribe may not properly exercise jurisdiction.'
example, are in a traffic accident on the reservation, a lawsuit by one driver
against the other has to be brought in state and not in tribal court."'"5 If just
one of the parties is Indian, then this should suffice to confer jurisdiction upon
the tribal judicial system." Thus, essentially every reservation-based activity
by a non-Indian affecting Indians or Indian property exposes one to the tribe's
civil jurisdiction."
If Montana does apply to the instant case, then the Court should have
developed an examination to discover the reasons that the tribal interests are
affected when the subject of the suit involves two non-Indians. Gisela
Fredericks was married to a deceased tribal member. For many years, Gisela
Fredericks had lived on the reservation. She was an imbedded member of the
community with verifiable ties to the Indian community. Her monetary loss,
pain, and suffering detrimentally impacted her five children, who claimed
tribal membership. Any adverse action against Gisela Fredericks substantially
threatened the tribal interests and the Indian community. Additionally, the
tribe had a considerable interest in protecting the health and safety of those
traveling on their roads and highways within the reservation.
A-1 Contractors entered into a consensual relationship with the tribe by
entering upon and transacting business within reservation. More than likely,
A-1 employed tribal members because the contractual relationship required AI to follow the employment rights code. A lawsuit against A-1 might have
caused layoffs and other negative repercussions, thus directly affecting the
economic security of the community in which A-1 worked. Accordingly, both
non-Indian parties have extensive ties to the community. Therefore, Montana
should not apply because Indian issues are implicated, even though technically
the accident arose between two non-Indians.

160.

STEPHAN PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES

154 (2d ed. 1992).

161. Id.

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 155.

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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IX. Future Ramifications of This Decision
The Court made an egregious error when it maintained that tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers only exists subject to an express authorization
or treaty.' " Up to this point, the converse had been the policy. All of the
powers were once held by the tribes. Indian tribes' sovereign powers include
all those that have not been limited or qualified by treaties, agreements, or
specific acts of Congress. This Court's decision shifts the presumption away
from tribal jurisdiction to one that only allows tribal action when a federal
statute or treaty has so deemed it.
The Court pronounced that National Farmers and Iowa Mutual did not
expand or stand apart from Montana's main rules and its exceptions, which
delineated the bounds of the tribes' power when exercising civil jurisdiction
over non-Indians.t" Thus, the Court made National Farmers and Iowa
Mutual virtually useless, reducing them to standing for nothing more than a
prudential rule based upon comity. In fact, the Court articulated that neither
National Farmers nor Iowa Mutual established "tribal-court adjudicatory
authority, even over the lawsuits involved in those cases. '
Essentially, ignoring the difference between tribal regulatory and
adjudicatory jurisdiction, the Court empowers the general rule of Montana
even further by declaring that when it does apply, then the exhaustion
requirement must give way. It defies reason and logic for the Court to
establish a rule requiring tribal exhaustion, and then pronounce a directive
limiting this to only tribal members. According to the Court, both decisions
only esinblish an exhaustion requirement "allowing tribal courts initially to
respond to an invocation of their jurisdiction.'1'
Once again, the line has been blurred between nonmember Indians and
tribal members. The Court repeatedly made references to nonmembers, rather
than just to non-Indians. Thus, reinstating the underpinnings evident in Duro
v. Reina. Hence, this case encompasses both non-member Indians and nonIndians alike. Many nonmember Indians reside outside their own tribal
jurisdicions and within the areas controlled by other tribes. This inauspicious
reference will cause turmoil in all tribal territories.
This would certainly create more of a "jurisdictional void" in Indian
country than presently exists, resulting in a situation where everyone refuses
to act, including the tribes, states, and federal government-hurting both Indian
and non-Indian alike. It seems unlikely that Congress would extend to the
tribes criminal jurisdictional powers over nonmember Indians, and then

168.
169.
170.
171.

Strate v. A-i Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1409 (1997).
Id. at 1413.
ld. at 1410.
Id.
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preclude an exercise of civil jurisdiction, a much less intrusive exercise of
jurisdiction.
X. Conclusion
"The federal judiciary is embracing the conservative, indeed, reactionary
posture of the 1890s, and as the pendulum swings even further to the right,
there is a danger that Plessy v. Ferguson will once again become mainstream
onstitutional law."'" In 1866 when Congress enacted the first Civil Rights
Act outlawing segregation, the United States Supreme Court struck it down,
thereby allowing people to discriminate based on public accommodations. The
Supreme Court frustrated Congress' intent, and the Jim Crow laws were
allowed to persist, finally being struck down in Brown v. Board of
Education." The Supreme Court stymied progress in this area for over one
hundred years. Just as in this case, the Court has successfully frustrated
the federal government's long-standing policy of supporting tribal selfgovernment, including tribal courts and self-determination.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two issues: (1) whether Montana
standards apply to adjudicatory jurisdiction; and (2) if Montana does apply,
what is the appropriate application. The proper conclusion to draw between
the National Farmers Union line of cases and the Montana lines of cases is
this: National Farmers Union, and subsequent cases, concerned tribal civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction, whereas, the Montana case, and those relying on its
rationale, should be limited to areas where tribal-state regulatory jurisdiction
conflicts arise on non-Indian owned fee land, such as over hunting and fishing
permits.
Many non-Indian plaintiffs have brought suits in tribal courts against Indian
defendants since the Williams v. Lee decision without suffering adversely or
needlessly. Today, in 1997, it should not matter whether the defendant is
Indian or non-Indian. The Supreme Court should not have endorsed nor
allowed such a deleterious decision to stand.
An analysis of Indian issues needs to occur involving those with the most
to lose, Indian people, to fit the realities of this day and age, instead of
relying on stale law and perpetuating the discrimination of old on a new
generation of Indian people. The time has come for those in power to listen
to the leaders of the Indian Nations. Congress should act immediately to
restore some sanity to this area of the law.

172. Deloria, Jr., supra note 35, at 963 (citing Plessy v Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
(upholding the state prosecution of Plessy when he refused to leave the coach reserved for
whites)).
173. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (concluding that in the field of public education the doctrine of

"separate but equal" has no place).
174. Can nine unelected people really do better than the legislature through the people?

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1997

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss1/5

